Entries for 'Iran'

We expect oil prices to average $101/b in 2022 and $85/b in 2023. However, the range of uncertainty remains large, including the extent of production cuts in Russia and in major OPEC members, the impact of the G7 oil price cap, and the prospects of nuclear agreement with Iran.

The MENA region has weathered the economic storm from the health crisis. The economic recovery continues to gain momentum. Higher energy prices will improve the fiscal and current account positions in oil exporters. In oil importers, deficits, government debt, and unemployment will remain high. 

While the election of Ebrahim Raisi as the new president will not derail the nuclear negotiations, the U.S. may not be able to extract concessions on critical issues. The likely outcome for the JCPOA negotiations is a return to the 2015 agreement, which would keep many sanctions in place. 

We compare the cases of 12 countries that have attempted to unify their FX markets. Unified exchange rate systems eliminate distortions, reduce rent-seeking, and boost fiscal revenues. However, successful unification hinges on consistent underlying credit and fiscal policies and broad reforms. 

Despite Biden’s election, the future of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) remains uncertain due to hardliner resistance in Iran and a divided US Congress. Failure to renegotiate the deal would likely keep the economy fragile. On the other hand, Iran’s economic potential is high if U.S. sanctions are lifted. 

Sovereigns are increasingly tapping capital markets to finance fiscal deficits. Private inflows to the MENA region continue to be dominated by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Resident outflows are declining but still exceed inflows. FDI remains subdued and concentrated in the energy sector. 

We examine currencies in the MENA region with large secondary market discounts, the biggest of which are in Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Sudan. The divergence of official and parallel FX rates in these countries reflects decades of economic mismanagement, public corruption, and international sanctions. 

Our MENA growth forecast stands at -0.3% with additional downside risks and high uncertainty over the duration of the shutdown and an additional potential fall on oil prices. We project recession in most oil exporters, the lowest growth in oil importers since the early 1990s, and wide twin deficits. 

U.S. sanctions have almost wiped out Iran’s ability to sell crude oil, pushing the economy into recession for a second year and spurring the authorities to increase taxes and cut subsidies. While they are reluctant to renegotiate the nuclear deal, the country's medium-term potential is considerable.

The extra 0.5 mbd cut may not be enough to rein in projected oversupply in 2020, since the OPEC+ bloc has already made cuts well beyond the 1.2 mbd target of the previous agreement. Consequently, we expect a decline in average Brent oil prices to $60 a barrel in 2020.

Non-resident capital inflows to the MENA region are projected to rise from $165bn last year to $200bn in 2019 before moderating to $173bn in 2020. With the increasing inflows, inclusion into global indices, and ongoing reforms, the MENA region is becoming more prominent on the EM investment map. 
 

We expect growth in the MENA region to slow to 1.4% in 2019 from 1.8% in 2018, dragged down by the deep recession in Iran and the compliance with the OPEC + deal. This aggregate picture, however, hides considerable heterogeneity in economic paths across the region.

We still expect Brent oil prices to average $65/b in 2019 and $62/b in 2020. Growth in non-OPEC supply combined with deceleration in global oil demand growth in 2019 and 2020, is offsetting upward pressure on oil prices from rising geopolitical tensions that could disrupt supply.

Re-imposition of sanctions have begun to cut oil and condensates exports A rapidly depreciating currency is feeding into soaring inflation and contrac

The impact could be muted if the main energy trading partners of Iran secure exemptions from the U.S. or can find a way

Recent protests have been fueled by unmet economic, social, and political expectations While the protests have ebbed in recent days, their underlying

Our preliminary estimate' of real hydrocarbon growth in fiscal year 2016/17 is about 20%, much more modest than 62% as reported by Iranian authorities

We expect president Hassan Rouhani to be re-elected for a second four-year term in May 2017.' Real GDP growth is expected to reach 5.7% in FY 2016/17,

Iran's February parliamentary elections were, overall, a victory for Iran's moderates (who favor economic and political reforms and engagement with th

President Barack Obama has secured enough Senate votes to support the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. Once IAEA confirms that Iran has ta