Entries for 'Sub-Saharan Africa'

Global liquidity conditions look set to tighten further, which will force CEEMEA central banks to continue to hike interest rates. Wider macro imbalances also call for tighter policies in some cases. Energy shortfalls could lead to falling output and employment, which would ease demand pressures.

Upside inflation surprises have prompted rate hikes by CEEMEA central banks. We project demand pressures to remain benign despite the ongoing recovery. Even so, markets are pricing further aggressive rate hikes in the coming months. Rising inflation has pushed up long-term bond yields across the region in ‘21H2. Wider term premiums reflect higher credit risk spreads in Turkey and Romania. South African bonds offer the most attractive real returns among CEEMEA bonds.

Nigeria’s exchange rate regime and FX shortages remain among the key issues. The Naira has come under renewed pressure in the parallel market in 2021Q3. We expect the CBN to undertake another step devaluation in the coming months. NDFs indicate that the currency could rise to NGN470/$ by the end of next year.

Inflation is rising due to higher food and energy prices, deglobalization, and supply chain disruptions. In addition, the recent increases in global CPI stem from widespread monetary easing and expansionary fiscal policy. Inflation may exceed central bank targets through 2022 and into 2023. 

The recovery has been uneven, with activity below pre-Covid levels for some sectors. Uncertain economic prospects will likely keep authorities from tightening policies. Losses in recent local elections may lead to delays of critical fiscal adjustment steps. Global factors, including tighter global liquidity conditions, could weigh on the Rand. Abrupt depreciation would force the SARB to tighten earlier than otherwise expected.

The result of higher oil prices is a shift in purchasing power from oil consumers to producers. Oil exporters are getting a boost to their terms of trade, leading to wider CA and fiscal surpluses. Higher energy prices will hurt several EMDEs that remain heavily dependent on petroleum imports.

Frontier Sub-Saharan Africa is emerging from the pandemic shock, but growth is comparably weak. We project a strong pickup in non-resident capital flows to $56.1 bn in 2021 from last year’s $23.6 bn. The recovery in FDI is robust, but persistently higher investment will be needed over the medium term. Financial conditions remain favorable, and strong Eurobond issuance drives the rise in portfolio flows. IMF emergency financing in 2020 and this year’s general SDR allocation have provided critical support. Assistance from IFIs will continue going forward, albeit at lower levels and with stronger conditionality. In addition, external financing needs are set to rise as substantial Eurobond amortization looms large. Thus, the region will need to attract higher and less volatile inflows to reduce external vulnerabilities. External financing risks are highest in Ghana, where market concerns over the country’s dent are rising. Angola and Nigeria are under less pressure, while IMF programs should help Kenya, Senegal, and Zambia.

We project non-resident flows of $128 bn to CEEMEA countries in 2021. Higher FDI and the IMF’s SDR allocation are the most important drivers. Excluding one-offs, however, flows will remain below pre-pandemic levels. G3 tightening will likely reduce investors’ appetite for EM assets in 21Q4. But further rate hikes in CEEMEA should improve portfolio flows in 2022. Non-resident flows to the region are estimated to reach $98 bn next year.

In this note, we update out view on inflation and monetary policy in emerging markets. Rising inflation, even if partially transitory, has forced the hand of EM central banks. We expect inflationary pressures in many countries to peak in the next six months. Slowing growth, favorable base effects, and lower commodity prices will be the drivers. However, rate hikes were also prompted by expansionary fiscal policy in some cases. Furthermore, tightening global liquidity in 2022 may add pressure on central banks.

Renewed pandemic containment measures weigh on economic activity in Kenya and Uganda. Low vaccination rates due to supply constraints make a stop-and-start recovery more likely. Benign inflation dynamics have allowed the BoU to continue its accommodative policy stance. However, real interest rates are still attractive and foreign capital has flown into the local market. This has supported the UGS, which continues to appreciate in nominal and real effective terms.

Upside inflation surprises prompted rate hike in most CEEMEA countries. We expect inflation to ease across the region, but high uncertainty remains. In Russia, we now see a higher terminal rate and easing to start later in ’22. The SARB can likely afford to stay on hold longer with only one hike in ‘22. We expect gradual cuts in Turkey through 2022 in line with market pricing. Despite above-target inflation, the Ukrainian NBU will likely stay on hold.

TBD

The Zambian Kwacha appreciated sharply in July-August, by ~25%. High copper prices and larger non-resident flows are likely responsible. The IMF’s SDR allocation will provide substantial relief to FX reserves. While external pressure is lower, high inflation will weigh on the ZMW. If transitory factors do not dissipate, interest rate hikes may be needed. Our outlook turns more constructive as an IMF program appears likely.

Fiscal challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 shock. We conduct a detailed analysis of adjustments under recently-approved IMF programs. Kenya and Uganda appear to be in need of the most ambitious consolidation efforts. Primary balance improvements are mostly driven by cuts to non-interest expenditures. We believe that program targets are largely achievable, with Uganda’s most ambitious. More IMF arrangements in SSA are on the horizon and Zambia will likely be a priority.

Mobile money use in Sub-Saharan Africa has grown substantially in recent years. Limited reach of traditional banking services likely contributed to this dynamic. We estimate that mobile money transactions reached around $275 bn in 2020. However, their importance differs considerably among countries in the region. The industry will likely undergo a fundamental transformation in coming years. Changes will include market entrance of existing app-based payment platforms.

Nigeria’s multiple exchange rate regime continues to give reasons for concern. We estimate the Naira to be overvalued by ~14% despite the recent devaluation. A weaker exchange rate could pass through to already high headline inflation. However, monetary policy tightening moderated the impact during past episodes. Thus, the transition to a market-determined exchange rate appears manageable.

We use VAR models to decompose the effect of commodities and FX on EM inflation. Turkey and Russia, for different reasons, appear most exposed to exchange rate shocks. Headline inflation in South Africa and Brazil appear to be driven by energy prices, while price dynamics in Indonesia are more responsive to non-energy commodities. We expect tight stances in Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Turkey to keep expectations anchored.

We continue our series on EM inflation by turning towards country specifics. In this note, we examine inflation dynamics in Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. As demand is a key driver of inflation in Russia, we expect further tightening. In South Africa, we see the pickup as transitory and largely driven by base effects. Turkey stands out with the highest inflationary pressures and little room to ease.

Sub-Saharan African countries will receive an estimated SDR16.2 bn in 2021Q3. While this will increase holdings markedly, it represents a small share of the total. We assess the impact of the allocation in four areas and find it relatively limited. For most of SSA’s largest economies, reserve adequacy will improve marginally. Respective allocations are also too small to fundamentally affect financing needs.