Entries for 'Sub-Saharan Africa'

Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the first recession in thirty years in 2020 due to the COVID-19 shock. The global recession weighed on external demand and pandemic-related shutdowns on domestic activity. However, commodity prices fared better than expected, and the virus spread less than in other regions. Oil exporters were hit hardest, while countries with more diversified export bases appear less affected. The economic slowdown has had a strong effect on countries’ fiscal positions, and policy space is scarce. As a result, debt is rising across the region, and many countries are seeking relief through the G20 DSSI. Improved market sentiment has led to a return of foreign investors and alleviated financing pressure. Growth is expected to rebound strongly in 2021 where macro and policy environments are supportive. Risks, however, skew to the downside and stem from a second COVID-19 wave and poliical instability.

Foreign investor interest in Sub-Saharan Africa has picked up in recent months. This is partially due to a marked shift to risk-on sentiment in financial markets. Countries from the region are now gradually returning to the Eurobond market. Still, the outlook for deficit financing and flows to local markets remains uncertain.

External and domestic imbalances will require meaningful policy changes. Fiscal consolidation is critical to eliminate monetary financing of deficits. This should reduce inflationary pressures and limit Kwacha depreciation. A multi-year IMF program will likely be needed to implement such changes.

Zambia has launched consent solicitation for a deferral of bond payments. Kwacha depreciation is the main driver of unsustainable debt dynamics. In a no-adjustment scenario, public debt could reach 200% of GDP by 2025. Upcoming general elections in August ’21 contribute to policy uncertainty.

In the October MTBPS, the government increased deficit targets again. This will result in a steeper rise and higher peak of government debt. We see substantial risks to both revenue and expenditure projections. Additional budgetary support to troubled SOEs also looks likely in ‘21.

We expect a slow and uneven recovery in non-resident capital flows globally. CEEMEA should fare somewhat better with a broad pickup in ‘20H2 and ‘21. The recovery will likely be driven by stronger FDI and portfolio capital flows. A possible COVID-19 resurgence and geopolitical risks weigh on the outlook. If sentiment worsens, Turkey, South Africa, and Ukraine will be most exposed.

Widening fiscal deficits could create financing challenges going forward. As the economy recovers, domestic investors may provide less funding. If fiscal consolidation is not realized, “prescribed assets" are one option. South Africa could also approach the IMF for a Stand-by-Arrangement.

The Supplementary Budget Review shows higher deficits and quickly rising debt. Nonetheless, foreign investors returned in May and yields have fallen sharply. A credible consolidation strategy is needed in October to sustain investor interest. Plans hinge on cuts to non-interest spending that will be difficult to implement.

Growth will slow down sharply to 0.9% in 2020 as a result of the global recession. Lower oil prices will help offset a decline in exports and collapse of tourism revenues. Support from multilaterals should keep reserve losses manageable at around $1.5 bn. The main downside risk for external financing is a sharp rise of oil prices in 2020H2. Furthermore, a steeper decline in non-resident FDI would be a source of concern.

EM are experiencing an unprecedented and synchronized growth slowdown in ‘20. Restrictions remain in place in many countries, as the health crisis is far from over. The fiscal response has been uneven in EM, with some running out of policy space. Most EM central banks cut rates aggressively, and QE has become part of the toolkit. Asset price recovery and a modest return of capital flows should provide support.

Lower oil prices, dwindling production, and COVID-19 have undercut hopes for growth in 2020, and turned external and fiscal surpluses to deficits. The medium-term outlook depends primarily on oil price and production recovery, and the continued implementation of structural reforms.

We assess Ghana’s external financing risk as low compared to regional peers. Eurobond issuance and multilateral support help offset impact of COVID-19. As a result, we estimate only moderate reserve losses of $800 mn in 2020. External debt amortization appears manageable this year and over 2021-22. Outflows could be triggered if deficits grow and/or are financed by the BOG.

Zambia’s external financing picture will continue to deteriorate in 2020. Sharply lower commodity prices will be a drag on the current account. At the same time, external debt repayments are set to increase markedly. As a result, already low foreign reserves are likely to fall even further. Additional external support of $0.5-1.0 bn would likely stabilize reserves.

Pressure on SSA assets has intensified due to COVID-19 related shocks. In this note, we analyze the composition of external flows to the region. SSA has become more globally integrated and reliant on portfolio flows. This makes the region more exposed to swings in investor sentiment.

COVID-19 presents a challenge to BoPs in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Lower commodity prices will sharply reduce exports in many countries. Dependence on tourism and remittances will also have a negative effect. C/A deficit financing is going to be challenging due to risk-off sentiment. Multilateral funding can cover some gaps, but solvency is an issue as well.

COVID-19 has exacerbated existing external pressures on Nigeria. Despite external support, we expect reserve losses of $8 bn in 2020. The c/a deficit remains significant in the context of low oil prices. At the same time, global risk-off behavior weighs on capital flows. Debt amortization and large fiscal deficits increase financing needs.

COVID-19 is exacerbating existing vulnerabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. The global recession and drop in commodity prices hit the region hard. We present a framework to summarize SSA’s exposure to different risks. Multilaterals need to play an important role in the region going forward.

Growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to slow down markedly. This is a result of lower global demand and falling commodity prices. Lower growth will inhibit advances in living standards across the region. We are concerned that COVID-19 outbreaks in SSA could be disastrous. Multilateral support, including from the IMF, is needed going forward.

We believe multilateral support will be critical for South Africa going forward. Moody’s rating downgrade will likely trigger further capital outflows in 2020Q2. This will continue the pressure on the ZAR, which we have flagged as overvalued. Economic contraction and higher funding costs will likely make debt unsustainable.

We now expect a recession in CEEMEA as a result of COVID-19. CEE will be affected by Euro area contraction but has policy space. ussia’s buffers and flexible Ruble should reduce impact on growth. Lower growth will markedly worsen debt dynamics in South Africa. Recession concerns could trigger further policy easing in Turkey.