Entries for 'Sub-Saharan Africa'

We assess Ghana’s external financing risk as low compared to regional peers. Eurobond issuance and multilateral support help offset impact of COVID-19. As a result, we estimate only moderate reserve losses of $800 mn in 2020. External debt amortization appears manageable this year and over 2021-22. Outflows could be triggered if deficits grow and/or are financed by the BOG.

Zambia’s external financing picture will continue to deteriorate in 2020. Sharply lower commodity prices will be a drag on the current account. At the same time, external debt repayments are set to increase markedly. As a result, already low foreign reserves are likely to fall even further. Additional external support of $0.5-1.0 bn would likely stabilize reserves.

Pressure on SSA assets has intensified due to COVID-19 related shocks. In this note, we analyze the composition of external flows to the region. SSA has become more globally integrated and reliant on portfolio flows. This makes the region more exposed to swings in investor sentiment.

COVID-19 presents a challenge to BoPs in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Lower commodity prices will sharply reduce exports in many countries. Dependence on tourism and remittances will also have a negative effect. C/A deficit financing is going to be challenging due to risk-off sentiment. Multilateral funding can cover some gaps, but solvency is an issue as well.

COVID-19 has exacerbated existing external pressures on Nigeria. Despite external support, we expect reserve losses of $8 bn in 2020. The c/a deficit remains significant in the context of low oil prices. At the same time, global risk-off behavior weighs on capital flows. Debt amortization and large fiscal deficits increase financing needs.

COVID-19 is exacerbating existing vulnerabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. The global recession and drop in commodity prices hit the region hard. We present a framework to summarize SSA’s exposure to different risks. Multilaterals need to play an important role in the region going forward.

Growth across Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to slow down markedly. This is a result of lower global demand and falling commodity prices. Lower growth will inhibit advances in living standards across the region. We are concerned that COVID-19 outbreaks in SSA could be disastrous. Multilateral support, including from the IMF, is needed going forward.

We believe multilateral support will be critical for South Africa going forward. Moody’s rating downgrade will likely trigger further capital outflows in 2020Q2. This will continue the pressure on the ZAR, which we have flagged as overvalued. Economic contraction and higher funding costs will likely make debt unsustainable.

We now expect a recession in CEEMEA as a result of COVID-19. CEE will be affected by Euro area contraction but has policy space. ussia’s buffers and flexible Ruble should reduce impact on growth. Lower growth will markedly worsen debt dynamics in South Africa. Recession concerns could trigger further policy easing in Turkey.

South Africa’s 2020 budget was well-received by financial markets. The proposed adjustment is largely driven by cuts to the wage bill. Savings are just enough to offset weaker revenue due to weak growth. Thus, public debt is still set to increase to ~70% of GDP by FY22/23. Key risks remain low growth, union resistance, and struggling SOEs.

Ethiopia has experienced the world’s highest real GDP growth in recent years. But high external financing needs and low reserves represent vulnerabilities. The recently approved IMF program will allow for buffers to be established. Structural reforms, in particular of SOEs, are needed for sustainable growth.

Real convergence in Sub-Saharan Africa has been weak despite robust growth. We believe that low total factor productivity growth is partially responsible. Furthermore, relatively weak investment is weighing on economic activity. As population growth slows, both will be key for standard-of-living gains.

South Africa and Mexico face significant fiscal risks from struggling SOEs. Both Eskom and Pemex are receiving sizable support from governments. Such risks prompt SARB and BANXICO to keep real rates above EM peers. A downgrade of sovereign credit ratings could lead to large portfolio outflows. However, risks to debt sustainability are higher in South Africa than Mexico.

Government debt in Sub-Saharan Africa has risen markedly in recent years. This is partly due to issuance of Eurobonds in a low interest rate environment. Debt amortization will peak in 2024-25, while financing needs remain high. As a result, these countries will need to attract significant non-resident capital. Tightening of global financial conditions could increase debt costs substantially.

Sub-Saharan Africa continues to display stronger growth than other EMs. However, this has not resulted in meaningful real convergence for most. Continued high, though declining, population growth is partly responsible. Higher productivity growth is necessary to improve living standards quicker. Rising indebtedness represents the key risk to the medium-term outlook.

Structural impediments remain unaddressed and constrain near-term growth. Low growth is the main reason for revenue underperformance and rising debt. Credible fiscal consolidation could improve business and consumer sentiment, paving the way for real GDP growth to pick up to around 2% in the medium term.

The release of the 2019 MTBPS was a wake-up call for politicians, just like in 2017. The 2020 budget in February, union negotiations, and Eskom resolution are key. Moody’s is likely to downgrade South Africa’s rating to sub-IG sometime in 2020. A deep domestic market and low short-term and FX debt mitigate our concerns. But with deteriorating debt dynamics, South Africa is exposed to external shocks.

Weak growth has led to deteriorating debt dynamics in recent years. Falling business and consumer confidence do not point to a recovery. External imbalances remain despite weak activity and depreciation. Interest payments to non-residents have risen sharply due to high debt. The Rand is vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment and portfolio flows.

Markets were disappointed by the 2019 MTBPS announcement. Revisions to growth, deficit, and debt were worse than expected. This follows an Eskom plan lacking details on debt restructuring. Moody’s changed the outlook to negative but kept the IG rating. Key market concern is no longer the rating, but debt sustainability.

Zambia borrowed extensively from abroad after 2015, leading to considerable external financing requirements. Fiscal and monetary policy will have to be contractionary, however, the level of adjustment needed is very large. Thus, Zambia is a prime candidate for an IMF program.