Entries for 'EM Europe'

Sanctions on a highly-integrated economy such as Russia are still unprecedented. Unforeseen and unintended consequences could significantly shake up markets. The impact is likely most significant for asset managers and banking institutions. But further consequences for the underlying market infrastructure are possible.

The debate on U.S. sanctions on sovereign debt is expected to continue in '20. Low macroeconomic vulnerabilities will likely limit the impact on Russia. U.S. investors would lose out given investments in Russian domestic debt. Unintended consequences could also significantly shake up global markets.

Large amortization payments will leave Turkey exposed to rollover risk in 2020. The composition of amortization payments should alleviate some of the concerns. Net foreign borrowing will continue to be an important determinant of growth. Residents could withdraw from assets abroad if they fail to roll over maturing debt.

Ukraine’s new agreement with the IMF is critical for external financing, even though recent flows into domestic bonds have alleviated pressure. The agreement signals confidence in ongoing reform efforts to markets, and will lead to renewed investor interest in local government bonds.

EU structural funds have boosted growth in Eastern Europe, allowing for strong income convergence with the rest of the EU. Cuts in the 2021-27 EU budget will lead to smaller contributions, but a sudden slowdown is unlikely, and convergence will continue.

Bank lending remains the main policy tool to boost growth. Macroeconomic imbalances seem manageable at this time. Further stimulus, however, could intensify demand pressures.

Russian authorities announced a policy pivot towards growth. National projects exceed 3% of GDP per year over 2019-24. Apart from national projects, policies will likely remain tight. We therefore expect only a modest pickup in Russia’s growth.

Growth in the Euro area slowed considerably in 2018 and 2019H1. CEE countries are highly integrated into European value chains. We already see evidence of a slowdown in industrial production. However, domestic demand continues to support robust growth. In case of further shocks, policy space is not universally available.

Investor interest in government bonds has picked up in recent months in the hope of a change in government and implementation of reforms. Macroeconomic imbalances, however, have risen to concerning levels, and a renewed EU Excessive Deficit Procedure is clearly on the horizon.

Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream will change gas transit in Europe, allowing Russian gas to reach Western Europe while bypassing Ukraine. Transit through Ukrainian pipelines could decrease as much as 80%, widening the current account deficit and increasing financing needs. Sanctions on both pipeline projects are being discussed in Congress.

Bank lending and accommodative policies helped output recover in 2019H1,but a continued fall in investment limits the pace of real GDP growth. TRY depreciation has led the current account to shift to a surplus, and FX reserves appear sufficiently large to cover external debt repayments. 

Borrowing costs have fallen sharply as a result of policy changes. Lending remains subdued due to concerns over bank asset quality. Credit-fueled growth has increased private sector indebtedness. Banks remain well-capitalized and profitability is set to increase. 

Robust growth has returned, driven by consumption. Non-resident inflows have led the Hryvnia to appreciate. A new IMF program is expected by the end of the year. The key risk to the outlook is potential for policy inaction. Public debt appears sustainable, assuming FX stability.

The risk of automation in CEE is relatively low compared to other EMs, but differs considerably within the region, with EU member countries facing less risk. The skill composition of employment appears to play an important role, as does an economy’s relative urbanization and labor market diversification.

Labor shortages and fragile investor confidence will constrain output growth. Policies will likely become more accommodative, thanks to a dovish ECB and Fed. The external financing and inflation outlook will remain challenging for some. Slow progress in addressing structural problems will intensify vulnerabilities.

Strong domestic spending has kept output above potential, intensifying inflation pressures. Weaker foreign demand should allow policies to remain accommodative in the near term. Labor shortages and reduced access to EU funds will be the main medium-term challenges. 

EU structural funds have boosted growth in Eastern Europe, allowing for strong income convergence with the rest of the EU. Cuts in the 2021-27 EU budget will lead to smaller contributions, but a sudden slowdown is unlikely, and convergence will continue.

Consumption-driven growth has led to increasing imbalances and inflation. Ad-hoc policy changes weigh on sentiment, undermining new investment. Further stimulus would pose risks to macroeconomic stability and outlook. 

A fiscal stimulus program provided support to private consumption and growth in early 2019. Accommodative policies are expected to continue through 2020, helping growth to remain robust. One-off revenues and cyclically strong tax collection will mask the deterioration in fiscal discipline. 

Georgia has shown impressive resilience during the period of an economic slowdown in the region. The government’s Four Point Plan is expected to remove structural bottlenecks and support strong growth. However, the economy remains vulnerable to regional developments and external shocks.